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Note 
How the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality 
Has Created a Gap in Environmental Protection 
at the 49th Parallel 
João C. J. G. de Medeiros∗ 
National boundaries constitute negative externalities and 
are environmental hazards because they allow companies to 
export harmful pollutants through transboundary rivers.1 Be-
cause a border limits the reach of the legal protections of the 
source country, the polluters do not have to bear the true social 
costs of their activities—only the costs generated entirely with-
in their home territories.2 As a consequence, polluters under-
take a level of activity that is greater than socially desirable,3 
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 1. See Martin F. Medeiros, Comment, Transboundary Water Rights: A 
Valuation for Efficient Allocation, 1 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 157, 158 (1993) 
(using the example of fertilizer runoff into rivers and the cost of the down-
stream cleanup to illustrate the externalization of the environmental costs of 
using fertilizer); see also THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO 
LAW 31 (2004) (“An externality exists when an individual . . . imposes a benefit 
or cost on some other individual who either does not have to pay for the bene-
fit, or is not compensated for the cost. The most common example of an exter-
nal cost (or negative externality) is pollution.”). 
 2. Cf. Ari Bessendorf, Note, Games in the Hothouse: Theoretical Dimen-
sions in Climate Change, 28 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 325, 341–42 (2005) 
(“States ‘externalize’ costs by forcing foreign states to bear the costs of a do-
mestic activity. . . . Since the polluter does not bear the cost of the environ-
mental damage it causes, it will pollute more than is optimal . . . .”). 
 3. Id. 
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and any additional harm is borne by individuals and groups 
that are left without legal recourse. 
Along the United States-Canadian boundary, this phenom-
enon has recently manifested in the Pacific Northwest and in 
North Dakota, where actors use this national boundary exter-
nality to subsidize or insure risky environmental behavior.4 
Even though a treaty regulating water pollution between the 
countries has been in place for almost a century,5 the public in-
ternational law system has unsatisfactorily controlled trans-
boundary pollution.6 A jurisdictional doctrine known as the 
presumption against extraterritoriality has also hindered ef-
forts to use national environmental statutes to correct the prob-
lem.7 The presumption holds that while national legislatures 
have the power to enact statutes with extraterritorial reach, 
they operate under the presumption that the legislature does 
not exercise that power without stating its intent to do so.8 This 
Note examines the present intractability of the transboundary 
water pollution problem along the 49th parallel—the north lati-
tude line that traces much of the United States-Canadian bor-
der9—and proposes that the United States and Canadian pre-
sumptions against extraterritoriality be altered to allow 
national courts to address the problem. While United States 
courts presently apply exceptions to the presumption to exer-
cise jurisdiction over transboundary cases, this Note proposes 
that courts should develop a rule that allocates cases to the fo-
rum best suited to remedy the problem presented. 
Part I outlines the facts of three recent cases dealing with 
the externalization of environmental harm across the United 
States-Canadian border and examines strategic state behavior 
 
 4. See Wil Burns et al., International Environmental Law, 40 INT’L LAW. 
197, 212–13 (2006). 
 5. See Boundary Waters Treaty, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 
2448. 
 6. See Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 
DUKE L.J. 931, 958–63 (1997) (discussing the failure of international treaties 
and arbitration to control transboundary pollution). 
 7. See, e.g., Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668, 676 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (applying the presumption to the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act in an action to bar recovery of damages incurred by the export of 
toxic waste abroad). 
 8. E.g., Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949); Soc’y of Compos-
ers, Authors & Music Publishers of Can. v. Canadian Ass’n of Internet Provid-
ers (SOCAN ), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427, 454 (Can.). 
 9. See OXFORD ATLAS OF THE WORLD 132–33 (5th ed. 1997) [hereinafter 
OXFORD ATLAS]. 
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in bilateral and multilateral contexts. It demonstrates that the 
bilateral relationship that the United States and Canada have 
in their boundary waters presents a challenge that public in-
ternational law cannot resolve. Part II addresses the jurisdic-
tional challenges faced by United States and Canadian courts 
ruling on transboundary pollution cases. Specifically, this Part 
addresses personal jurisdiction, the presumption against extra-
territoriality, and the exceptions to that presumption. Part III 
proposes a different model for examining “interterritorial” envi-
ronmental cases that United States and Canadian courts can 
use. This Note concludes by calling upon courts in both coun-
tries to collaborate and adopt the proposed framework. 
I.  POLLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES-CANADIAN 
TRANSBOUNDARY WATERWAYS AND THE FAILURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TO PREVENT IT   
A. THE CHALLENGE OF TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION 
Canadian environmentalists are worried about United 
States Coast Guard live ammunition training in the Great 
Lakes—the lead in the bullets is toxic to fish, algae, and plank-
ton.10 Montana is concerned that coal mining in Canada will 
lead to the contamination of the Flathead River.11 And, the 
trumpeter swans of Judson Lake—which straddles the border 
between British Columbia and Washington State—are fatally 
ingesting lead shot deposited on the muddy lake bottom, yet 
neither government has taken any action to clean up the site.12 
Water pollution along the 49th parallel is a problem. 
Almost a century ago, the United States and Canada dedi-
cated themselves to controlling that problem. The Boundary 
Waters Treaty,13 signed in 1909, contained a promise that the 
“waters flowing across the boundary shall not be polluted on ei-
ther side to the injury of health or property on the other.”14 The 
treaty has enjoyed some success. Its most famous achievement 
 
 10. James Keller, U.S. Arms Coast Guard on Great Lakes, HAMILTON 
SPECTATOR (Ont., Can.), Sept. 29, 2006, at A01, available at 2006 WLNR 
16864969. 
 11. George Ochenski, Policy Hypocrisy: Is Schweitzer’s Environmentalism 
Sinking in Tar?, MISSOULA INDEP., Sept. 14, 2006, at 11, available at 2006 
WLNR 19680958. 
 12. Judson Lake Trumpeter Swans, http://www 
.judsonlaketrumpeterswans.ca (last visited Nov. 3, 2007). 
 13. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 5. 
 14. Id. art. IV. 
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to date is the Trail Smelter Arbitration.15 In that case, the In-
ternational Joint Commission (IJC), which was created by the 
treaty, resolved a dispute arising from damage caused by emis-
sions from a smelter in Trail, British Columbia.16 
Unresolved environmental harms, however, continue to 
move in either direction across the border. Even the Trail smel-
ter is once again the center of a controversy that may come be-
fore the United States Supreme Court.17 Over the course of the 
twentieth century, the smelter dumped millions of tons of 
slag—the sludge that remains after metals are extracted from 
ore—into the Columbia River.18 As a result, waste flowed into 
Washington State, building up behind the Grand Coulee Dam 
and creating one of the nation’s most contaminated sites.19 In 
the litigation arising out of this contamination, the Ninth Cir-
cuit deftly sidestepped the presumption against extraterrito-
riality.20 The court found Teck Cominco, the present owner of 
the smelter, potentially liable under the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA).21 This statute imposes on polluters the costs ac-
cruing from researching how best to clean up contaminated 
sites.22 While Teck Cominco has settled with the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) for these preliminary costs,23 it 
 
 15. See Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 1905 
(Trail Smelter Arb. Trib. 1938 & 1941). 
 16. See Michael J. Robinson-Dorn, The Trail Smelter: Is What’s Past Pro-
logue? EPA Blazes a New Trail for CERCLA, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 233, 243–
53 (2006) (providing a detailed narrative of the Trail Smelter Arbitration and 
its attendant circumstances). 
 17. See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 
2006), petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2007) (No. 06-
1188); Karen Dorn Steele, High Court Issues Order in Columbia Pollution 
Case: Solicitor General Brief Sought in Teck Cominco Appeal, SPOKESMAN-
REV. (Spokane, Wash.), June 5, 2007, at 1A, available at 2007 WLNR 
11633843 (describing the present controversy and noting that the Supreme 
Court has asked the United States Solicitor General to submit an amicus brief 
on the case). 
 18. See Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1069 (stating that the smelter discharged 
up to 145,000 tons of slag per year into the Columbia River between 1906 and 
1995). 
 19. Robinson-Dorn, supra note 16, at 266–68. 
 20. See Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1075 (holding that the “release” of toxins 
from decaying slag into American waters, not the dumping of the slag into the 
Canadian section of the Columbia River, created the CERCLA violation). 
 21. Id. at 1082; see also Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2000). 
 22. Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1072. 
 23. Id. at 1071–72 n.10. 
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still maintains that it is not liable for the costs ultimately in-
volved in cleaning up the damage.24 This continued recalci-
trance leaves open the possibility of future litigation. 
In addition to the continued controversy over the Trail 
smelter, Manitoba has been arguing with North Dakota about 
the Continental Divide, which passes through the state and  
separates the Hudson Bay drainage basin from the Missouri 
River basin.25 North Dakota wishes to build an artificial con-
nection, the Northwest Area Water Supply Project (NAWS), be-
tween the two basins.26 NAWS would allow the state to provide 
fresh water to water-poor regions in the northwestern portion 
of the state.27 Manitoba, which shares some of the Hudson Bay 
basin, has expressed concern that such a project could lead to 
cross-contamination of the basins with invasive species, 
prompting an ecological meltdown on the same level as the ze-
bra mussel infestation in the Great Lakes.28 In 2005, a United 
States federal district court found Manitoba’s argument com-
pelling, and a district judge used the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA)29 to order a more searching environmental 
assessment of the project.30 As in the Trail Smelter Case, the 
district court found that the application of the United States 
statute was not extraterritorial.31 
Later that same year, however, Manitoba and a number of 
environmental groups lost a different face-off with a North Da-
kota water project. This time, the state sought to connect De-
vils Lake to the Sheyenne River.32 The lake has no natural out-
let, causing its water level to fluctuate dramatically and 
leading to floods which damage property along its shores.33 
North Dakota sought to build an artificial outlet in order to 
 
 24. Lloyd’s Underwriters v. Cominco Ltd., [2006] 12 W.W.R. 486, 498 
(B.C.S.C.) (Can.), aff’d, [2007] 7 W.W.R. 281 (B.C. Ct. App.). 
 25. See Manitoba v. Norton, 398 F. Supp. 2d 41, 45 & n.1 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 26. Id. at 46. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See id. at 45 & n.4. 
 29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2000). 
 30. Norton, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 65. 
 31. Manitoba v. Norton, No. 02-cv-02057(RMC), at 4–5 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 
2003) (order denying motions for judgment on the pleadings) (allowing the 
case to proceed because it believed that “appropriate restraints within the 
United States” might be sufficient to grant standing and declining to find that 
“NEPA has true extraterritorial application”). 
 32. See People to Save the Sheyenne River, Inc. v. N.D. Dep’t of Health, 
697 N.W.2d 319, 323–24 (N.D. 2005). 
 33. Id. at 323. 
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control this flooding.34 However, the lake’s isolation may have 
also led to the development of a unique ecosystem, and there 
were concerns that such an outlet, like NAWS, would create the 
risk of cross-contamination of invasive species.35 Manitoba lost 
this court battle in the North Dakota Supreme Court.36 Moreo-
ver, as no federal funds were being used in the project, NEPA 
was inapplicable.37 
Thus, although the Boundary Waters Treaty and its adju-
dicatory body are in place, a series of lawsuits involving these 
problems continue to find their way into domestic courts. How-
ever, this litigation is not altogether unexpected. It is instead 
the consequence of an interaction of geography and the strateg-
ic behavior of nation-states. 
B. THE FAILURE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS TO RESOLVE 
THE PROBLEM 
Public international law governs the way in which nations 
structure their behavior in relation to each other on the inter-
national stage.38 Private international law, on the other hand, 
governs the choice of municipal law to be applied in disputes 
between private parties.39 Recognized sources of public interna-
tional law include treaties,40 custom,41 and international rule-
making institutions.42 When a nation becomes involved in an 
international dispute, the disagreement may arise in either a 
bilateral or a multilateral context. Bilateral disputes involve 
breaches of treaties between nations or of customary interna-
tional law.43 Multilateral disputes, conversely, involve a breach 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. Blake Nicholson, Groups Complain About DL Outlet to NAFTA Com-
mission: Opponents Say Outlet Breaks International Law, GRAND FORKS 
HERALD, Mar. 28, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 5124873. 
 36. People to Save the Sheyenne River, 697 N.W.2d at 333. 
 37. See Envtl. Rights Coal., Inc. v. Austin, 780 F. Supp. 584, 594 (S.D. 
Ind. 1991) (stating that NEPA jurisdiction over a project only exists where 
there is federal funding). 
 38. See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (3d 
ed. 1999). 
 39. See id.; see also id. at 4 (defining municipal law as “the internal laws 
of national legal systems”). 
 40. Id. at 5. 
 41. Id. at 5–6. 
 42. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 694–
96 (5th ed. 1998) (listing the ways in which international organizations can 
serve as sources of public international law). 
 43. See Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in Interna-
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of the state’s obligations to the constituency of an international 
institution of which it is a member.44 The context in which the 
dispute arises affects the nation’s response. In turn, the na-
tion’s response impacts private litigants’ ability to influence the 
resolution of the problem. 
1. State Participation in International Dispute Resolution 
Independent, sovereign nations operate upon an interna-
tional stage which is disordered and anarchic—there is no 
world government.45 Given the risk that a nation may lose any 
adjudicative proceeding to which it is a party, and the fact that 
it may choose not to participate in such proceedings, a nation 
will not subject itself to international dispute resolution unless 
it has an incentive to do so.46 
In bilateral dispute resolution, there is a prospective incen-
tive for participation. A country “will comply with [an adverse 
decision] if the cost of compliance is less than the future bene-
fits of continued use of adjudication.”47 In the bilateral context, 
the future benefits of arbitration are a function of the country’s 
expectation that over time, it can generally expect to win as 
much as it loses.48 In the multilateral context, however, com-
pliance reinforces the supranational structure which the mem-
ber state helped erect.49 This support benefits the member state 
 
tional Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1, 14–19 (2005) (outlining a theory as to why 
states submit their disputes to arbitration). But see Laurence R. Helfer & 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response 
to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REV. 899, 940 (2005) (limiting the 
usefulness of Posner’s arguments to bilateral relationships). 
 44. See Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 
STAN. L. REV. 429, 463–64 (2003) (claiming, using the example of the World 
Trade Organization, that “compulsory dispute settlement provides a frame-
work for ensuring that [member states] will follow through on their coopera-
tive agreements rather than defecting”). 
 45. See id. at 431 (“No international sovereign imposes order on the sys-
tem [of international law].”). 
 46. Posner & Yoo, supra note 43, at 21. 
 47. Id. at 20. 
 48. See id. at 20–21 (explaining that a “state that expects to lose . . . would 
refuse to consent” to arbitration unless the state can expect that, over time, 
decisions will fall within an acceptable “win set”). A country’s decision to sub-
mit a particular dispute to arbitration will be based on the expected value of 
the arbitration—the value determined by looking at the cost and benefits of 
potential outcomes discounted by the probability of each outcome. Id. The his-
torical data which makes up the “win set” helps a country to determine the 
probability of any given outcome. Id. 
 49. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 43, at 935 (“By increasing the 
probability of both material sanctions and reputational harm, international 
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because the state can expect that its interests will be protected 
in arbitrations to which it is not a party.50 Thus, even if the na-
tion loses a multilateral dispute, that defeat may still serve its 
long-term interests.51 
The different balance of interests presented by bilateral 
and multilateral disputes explains why private parties are ex-
cluded from international forums that resolve bilateral dis-
putes,52 but may be permitted to sue in multilateral forums.53 If 
states were to open up access to private parties, the number of 
disputes in which a state could expect to be involved would in-
crease dramatically.54 By comparison, any given private liti-
gant with access to such forums likely would be a party to only 
a small number of lawsuits55—often only one or two. In bilater-
al dispute forums, this surge in litigation would impose tre-
mendous costs on states while failing to provide a concurrent 
 
tribunals raise the cost of violations, thereby increasing compliance and en-
hancing the value of the agreement for all parties.”).  
 50. See id. at 938–39 (hinting that supranational tribunals “minimiz[e] 
. . . negative externalities [exported by a party in breach of international law 
to] all member states”). 
 51. The same thing can be said of bilateral investment treaties. Although 
the signatory state can often be sued by private litigants through such trea-
ties, cooperation by the country increases its reputation among foreign inves-
tors and helps to attract additional investment. See Susan D. Franck, Integrat-
ing Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems Design, 92 MINN. L. REV. 
161, 173–73 (2007). 
 52. See, e.g., International Court of Justice, Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.icj-cij.org/information/index.php (follow “Frequently Asked Ques-
tions” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 3, 2007) [hereinafter International Court 
FAQ] (noting that the International Court of Justice is a forum to which states 
may submit their disputes, but that it has no jurisdiction to deal with applica-
tions from individuals or private entities). 
 53. See Henry W. McGee, Jr. & Timothy W. Woolsey, Transboundary Dis-
pute Resolution as a Process and Access to Justice for Private Litigants: Com-
mentaries on Cesare Romano’s The Peaceful Settlement of International Envi-
ronmental Disputes: A Pragmatic Approach (2000), 20 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y 109, 116 (2001/2002) (book review) (“International bodies that do grant 
standing to non-state parties now outnumber those with limited state-to-state 
jurisdiction.”). For example, trading blocs like the WTO, NAFTA, and the EU 
grant access to private litigants. Id. However, such access is generally limited 
to economic and trade disputes. Id. 
 54. See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 159–60 (1984) (outlining 
the sheer volume of litigation in which the United States federal government 
is involved due to its “geographic breadth” and the “nature of the issues” it li-
tigates); see also Martinez, supra note 44, at 439 (noting that granting private 
parties access to international forums “tends to increase the number of cases 
brought”). 
 55. See Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 159–60. 
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benefit,56 because the state would only face off against each in-
dividual litigant a few times. Furthermore, as the state will 
most likely play the role of a defendant,57 the expected value of 
such litigation would always be negative for the state party.58 
In the multilateral context, however, each state would still reap 
the benefits of an international legal framework.59 
In fact, the increase in litigation would enhance compliance 
by other member states by increasing the costs of noncom-
pliance.60 Thus, the current structure of public international 
law maximizes benefits for nations by encouraging litigation 
which is potentially beneficial to states, while discouraging liti-
gation that only imposes costs. Unfortunately, this maximiza-
tion presents a problem for those seeking to address trans-
boundary pollution along the United States-Canadian border. 
2. Transboundary Water Disputes Between the United States 
and Canada Inhibit the Participation of Private Parties 
The alluvial geography of North America61 creates an es-
sentially bilateral interaction between the United States and 
Canada over their transboundary waters.62 The United States 
 
 56. See id. at 160 (using this as one justification for prohibiting the use of 
offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel against the federal government). 
 57. See Eric Gottwald, Leveling the Playing Field: Is It Time for a Legal 
Assistance Center for Developing Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration?, 22 
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 237, 245–46, 265 (2007) (noting that arbitration clauses 
in bilateral investment treaties allow private investors to enforce treaty obli-
gations against state parties and, as a result, the “state is a defendant” in such 
arbitrations).  
 58. The cost in the case of a victory for the state party would be the cost of 
litigating, which would be compounded with the cost of providing a remedy in 
the event of an adverse decision. 
 59. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 43, at 938–39 (explaining how in-
dependent international tribunals can “help states resolve cooperation prob-
lems arising from treaties that regulate public goods or the global commons” 
and thus minimize negative externalities). 
 60. See Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der 
Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 13 (“The vigilance of individuals concerned to pro-
tect their rights amounts to an effective supervision in addition to the supervi-
sion entrusted [to] . . . the Member States.”). 
 61. See Noah Hall, Bilateral Breakdown: U.S.-Canada Pollution Disputes, 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Summer 2006, at 18, 18 (“The [United States and 
Canada] share a five thousand-mile border that includes approximately 150 
rivers and lakes containing over 90 percent of North America’s fresh surface 
water, and over 20 percent of the total fresh surface water in the world.”). 
 62. See id. at 19 (“Beginning nearly a century ago, the two countries es-
tablished the foundation for their bilateral relationship on environmental mat-
ters with the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909[,] . . . [which] provides legal ob-
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is the only country with which Canada shares an international 
boundary.63 There is no interaction between the river systems 
that cross the United States-Canada border and those that 
cross the United States border with Mexico.64 It is therefore 
unsurprising that the two countries have sought to resolve 
their boundary water problems in a manner typical of the bila-
teral international framework—by creating a dispute forum 
that bars private party access.65 As a result, disputes that 
reach final arbitration are often resolved in a manner that 
serves the political needs of the countries, rather than in a form 
that redresses the injuries suffered by those harmed by pollu-
tion. For example, in the Trail Smelter Arbitration, political 
compromises eventually limited recovery to a mere $428,000 of 
the $2 million in damage claims originally submitted.66 A brief 
examination of the international adjudicative bodies that could 
potentially exercise jurisdiction over United States-Canadian 
cases shows that a private environmental litigant will be una-
ble to find relief at the international level. 
a. Bilateral Dispute Resolution Forums—The International 
Court of Justice and the International Joint Commission 
The International Court of Justice (International Court) is 
a forum for resolving disputes of a predominantly bilateral cha-
racter.67 While it has the jurisdiction to resolve any treaty dis-
 
ligations and a dispute resolution mechanism between the United States and 
Canada for the two countries’ shared boundary waters.”). 
 63. See OXFORD ATLAS, supra note 9, at 132–33. 
 64. See Manitoba v. Norton, 398 F. Supp. 2d 41, 45 (D.D.C. 2005) (“The 
Continental Divide separates water flows in the United States so that streams 
flow to opposite sides of the continent.”). Compare OXFORD ATLAS, supra note 
9, at 132–33 (showing that no river crosses both the United States-Canada 
border and the United States-Mexico border), with id. at 11 (showing that the 
Danube River touches the boundaries of ten countries—Germany, Austria, 
Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, and the 
Ukraine). 
 65. See, e.g., Robinson-Dorn, supra note 16, at 248–50 (explaining that the 
Trail Smelter Arbitration, which involved toxic smoke emissions from the 
smelter in Trail, British Columbia, only came before the International Joint 
Commission when the United States government nationalized the issue). Even 
more generally, “[m]ost international environmental institutions lack forums 
with jurisdiction to resolve international environmental disputes between na-
tions, more less [sic] provide a forum for private actors.” McGee & Woolsey, 
supra note 53, at 116. 
 66. See Robinson-Dorn, supra note 16, at 250–52 (combining pre-1932 
emission damages ($350,000) with those from 1932–1937 ($78,000)). 
 67. While the procedural rules of the International Court permit interven-
tion by other states, in practice, the court rarely allows such third-party inter-
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putes brought before it,68 many of the broader multilateral 
treaties have their own dispute resolution bodies.69 The Inter-
national Court also has jurisdiction to hear cases dealing with 
customary international law.70 Unfortunately, since the dis-
putes brought before it are bilateral, states have nothing to 
gain by opening standing to private parties.71 Thus, the Inter-
national Court can only hear disputes between states and is not 
available to private litigants in transboundary pollution cas-
es.72  
The IJC, on the other hand, is a body that owes its entire 
existence to a bilateral agreement: the Boundary Waters Trea-
ty between the United States and Canada.73 This treaty go-
verns the use of the waters shared by both countries.74 While 
the IJC serves a mainly advisory function,75 it can hear cases 
under certain circumstances.76 However, the IJC can only issue 
findings of fact, not binding decisions, in pollution cases.77 Fur-
 
vention. U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], Dispute Settlement 
§ 1.2, at 19, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.19 (2003), available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add19_en.pdf (discussing dispute 
settlement under the International Court of Justice). 
 68. See International Court of Justice, Basis of the Court’s Jurisdiction, 
http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php (follow “Contentious Jurisdiction” 
hyperlink; then follow “Basis of the Court’s Jurisdiction” hyperlink) (last vi-
sited Nov. 3, 2007) [hereinafter International Court Jurisdiction] (“Article 36, 
paragraph 1, of the Statute [of the International Court of Justice] provides 
that the jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to 
it.”). 
 69. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 43, at 926 tbl.2(a) (listing a num-
ber of such courts). 
 70. See International Court Jurisdiction, supra note 68 (citing the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice for the proposition that the court has ju-
risdiction concerning “any question of international law”). 
 71. Private parties would not be repeat actors of the type that incentivize 
states to submit to outside arbitration in the bilateral context. See Posner & 
Yoo, supra note 43, at 20–21 (theorizing that states submit to bilateral arbi-
tration as part of a long-term strategy, rather than to solve discrete incidents). 
 72. See International Court FAQ, supra note 52. 
 73. See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 5, art. VII. 
 74. See id. preliminary art. (defining “boundary waters”). 
 75. See International Joint Commission, Who We Are, http://www.ijc.org/ 
en/background/ijc_cmi_nature.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2007) (stating that the 
Commission can investigate and monitor pollution problems and recommend 
actions). 
 76. See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 5, art. VIII (granting the 
power to make binding decisions regarding “all cases involving the use or ob-
struction or diversion of the [boundary] waters”). 
 77. See id. art. IX (limiting the IJC’s power in all other cases within its 
jurisdiction). 
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thermore, even in this limited capacity, the IJC can only con-
duct proceedings if either the United States or Canada initiates 
them—private litigants do not have standing.78 Thus, private 
parties cannot rely on the IJC to provide them with adequate 
relief. 
b. Multilateral Dispute Resolution Forums—The World Trade 
Organization and the North American Free Trade Agreement 
Both the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)79 are multilateral 
arrangements with their own judicial bodies.80 While private 
parties have standing to sue in these courts,81 complaints are 
limited to the jurisdictional competence of the bodies.82 This 
competence extends only to the particular harms the member 
states sought to eliminate through the treaty (i.e., the economic 
costs associated with barriers to trade).83 Granting private par-
ties access to these judicial bodies helps the organizations mi-
nimize the ability of any single member to externalize costs to 
other members.84 Noncompliant member states free ride on the 
benefits created by cooperative member states.85 At the same 
 
 78. See id. (stating that controversies between the “High Contracting Par-
ties” shall be “referred from time to time to the International Joint Commis-
sion for examination and report, whenever either the Government of the Unit-
ed States or the Government of the Dominion of Canada shall request that 
such questions or matters of difference be so referred”). Note, however, that 
the Trail Smelter Arbitration was decided under a special agreement that 
granted the IJC, in that specific case, the power to assign damages. See Robin-
son-Dorn, supra note 16, at 248–50. 
 79. U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M 289 (1993) [hereinafter 
NAFTA]. 
 80. See McGee & Woolsey, supra note 53, at 113 (contrasting Romano’s 
focus on the International Court’s role in international environmental disputes 
with his neglect of “other, sometimes compulsory, adjudication contained in 
such multilateral agreements as . . . the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) 
. . . and regional entities such as the European Union (“EU”) and the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”)”). 
 81. See id. at 116. 
 82. See id. at 119–24 (describing the access of private parties to the WTO 
and NAFTA courts). 
 83. See NAFTA, supra note 79, art. 102; Final Act Embodying the Results 
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations arts. II(1) & III, Apr. 
15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144–45 (1994) (WTO Agreement).  
 84. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 43, at 938–39 (citing the role of 
supranational courts as “minimizing the parties’ negative externalities [in-
flicted] upon all member states”). 
 85. See MICELI, supra note 1, at 32 (discussing the “free-rider problem” as 
a potential source of market failure). 
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time, their noncompliance creates a negative externality for all 
other member states.86 By tying themselves to binding dispute 
resolution systems, states seek to resolve both of these prob-
lems. However, the narrow economic focus of these agreements 
means private parties seeking to have environmental wrongs 
corrected are often excluded from these forums.87 
Although there is an environmental side agreement to 
NAFTA88 with its own adjudicative body,89 the remedy availa-
ble to such plaintiffs is merely a “spotlight remedy” that does 
not provide concrete relief90—the environmental court only has 
the power to publish findings.91 
The difference in the remedies available in the North 
American trade and environmental courts is a consequence of 
the relationship of each field of law to the continent’s geogra-
phy. Trade has a longer geographic reach than discreet envi-
ronmental harms.92 For example, while Mexican trade barriers 
could impose costs upon the Canadian market,93 the presence of 
the United States between the two countries creates a vast buf-
fer zone that environmental harm emanating from either is un-
 
 86. See id. at 31 (stating that the most common example of a negative ex-
ternality is pollution). 
 87. See McGee & Woolsey, supra note 53, at 119, 121 (stating that the 
access of private parties to the WTO and NAFTA courts is limited, particularly 
with regard to environmental disputes). 
 88. See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-
Can.-Mex., Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480. 
 89. See McGee & Woolsey, supra note 53, at 121 (explaining that the 
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation “provides a forum 
for private parties to bring complaints before a trilateral Commission for En-
vironmental Cooperation”). 
 90. See Nicholson, supra note 35. 
 91. See id. (“A commission investigation produces a report that does not 
make any recommendations and might not even be made public.”); see also 
DEVILS LAKE: Commission Receives Revised Outlet Complaint; Environmen-
tal Groups Request Investigation, GRAND FORKS HERALD, July 17, 2006, avail-
able at 2006 WLNR 12260709 [hereinafter DEVILS LAKE] (observing that 
while “the ‘citizen submission’ process does not include the possibility of sanc-
tions,” it does allow groups to “draw attention to an issue”). 
 92. See Lincoln L. Davies, Note, If You Give the Court a Commerce Clause: 
An Environmental Justice Critique of the Supreme Court Interstate Waste Jur-
isprudence, 11 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 207, 272–73 (1999) (explaining the geo-
graphically limited environmental harm of landfills and chastising the Court’s 
interpretation of the Dormant Commerce Clause for commercializing waste 
and thereby broadening the geographic reach of garbage). 
 93. See, e.g., Hot Rolled Steel Sheet from Canada, Case No. MEX-96-1904-
03, Final Decision at 1 (NAFTA Binational Panel June 16, 1997), reprinted in 
RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., HANDBOOK OF NAFTA DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (1998) 
(deciding a Mexican-Canadian dispute over tariffs for hot rolled steel). 
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likely to penetrate.94 Thus, while the trade relationship created 
by NAFTA is multilateral, the environmental relationship 
amongst the bloc’s members can be seen as two bilateral rela-
tionships: the United States-Mexico relationship and the Unit-
ed States-Canada relationship. The limited remedy available 
under the NAFTA side agreement therefore arises as a function 
of state self-interest.95 And, while in some cases the decisions of 
the side agreement’s court have prompted action by the gov-
ernments of member states,96 publicity is a poor substitute for 
injunctive relief or damages. Indeed, it is the very inadequacy 
of relief on the international stage that has prompted private 
parties, and political subdivisions such as Manitoba, to seek it 
elsewhere.97  
C. CANADIAN AND AMERICAN NATIONAL COURTS’ OPPORTUNITY 
TO ADDRESS THE POLLUTION CROSSING THE 49TH PARALLEL 
Legal commentators have both applauded98 and decried99 
the growth of transnational lawsuits. However, Professor Jenny 
S. Martinez’s recent scholarship argues that such suits play a 
 
 94. See OXFORD ATLAS, supra note 9, at 132–33 (showing that even at 
their closest point, the Canadian and Mexican borders to the United States 
are separated by more than one thousand miles). 
 95. The member states would not expect challenges to arise from repeat 
private litigants, and as a result, would expect no long-term benefit from sub-
mitting to compulsory binding arbitration. See Posner & Yoo, supra note 43, at 
20–21 (theorizing that states submit to bilateral arbitration as part of a long-
term strategy, rather than to solve discrete incidents). 
 96. See McGee & Woolsey, supra note 53, at 122–23 (“While public expo-
sure is the only sanction available to private parties under Article 14 [of the 
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation], it has resulted in 
member-states abandoning environmentally harmful decisions.”). 
 97. For example, the plaintiffs from People to Save the Sheyenne River, 
Inc. v. North Dakota Department of Health, 697 N.W.2d 319 (N.D. 2005), only 
filed a complaint with NAFTA after losing in the North Dakota Supreme 
Court. See DEVILS LAKE, supra note 91 (stating that the plaintiffs originally 
filed a NAFTA complaint in March of 2006). 
 98. See Robinson-Dorn, supra note 16, at 235 (“Teck Cominco can’t send 
highly toxic sludge across the border and then insist that border protects them 
from liability. They created one big mess here in the U.S., and they should 
clean it up . . . .”). 
 99. See Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Juris-
diction over Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 47 
(2006) (“An exorbitant jurisdictional assertion . . . ‘can readily arouse foreign 
resentment,’ ‘provoke diplomatic protests,’ ‘trigger commercial or judicial re-
taliation, and threaten friendly relations in unrelated fields.’” (quoting Gary B. 
Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 28–29 (1987))). 
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vital role in the international judicial regime.100 This nascent 
judicial system is the result of the knitting together of indepen-
dent national, supranational, and international courts.101 By 
engaging in interjurisdictional dialogue in case law, courts 
have established procedural rules that serve two important 
functions: appropriately allocating cases among courts that 
may have equal jurisdictional claims102 and ensuring that the 
rulings given in such cases are respected in other jurisdic-
tions.103 
1. The Use of Procedural Doctrines to Allocate Cases to the 
Appropriate Court 
Federal or pseudo-federal structures present many inter-
esting examples of legal doctrines that allocate jurisdiction 
among national and local court systems. One American alloca-
tive doctrine, Pullman abstention, requires federal courts to re-
frain from deciding constitutional cases where a state court re-
solving a complicated matter of state law would also avoid the 
question.104 Another example can be found in the rule of Foto-
Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, where the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) claimed the power to strike down European 
Union (EU) legislation, while denying that power to national 
European courts.105 One court’s decision to allocate decision-
making power to another, however, is insufficient without the 
cooperation of that other court. 
2. The Use of Judicial Dialogue to Convince Other Courts to 
Respect the Allocation of Cases 
When a court attempts to allocate a case, it is immediately 
faced with the challenge of convincing its sister court to respect 
the allocation.106 This requires judicial dialogue. The European 
experience serves as a useful illustration. In response to con-
cerns articulated by a German court that the EU did not pro-
tect the fundamental human rights enshrined in the German 
 
 100. See Martinez, supra note 44, at 432. 
 101. See id. at 436–44 (describing this process thus far). 
 102. Id. at 449–52. 
 103. Id. at 452–53. 
 104. See R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941). 
 105. Case 314/85, 1987 E.C.R. 4199, 4231. 
 106. See Martinez, supra note 44, at 479–80 (describing how courts of sepa-
rate jurisdictions exercise discretion in choosing to recognize or reject the 
judgments of foreign courts). 
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Constitution, the ECJ recognized such rights at the European 
level.107 Similarly, Germany’s refusal to recognize the judg-
ments of countries that would not recognize its own decisions 
prompted a change in the French practice of reviewing all for-
eign judgments.108 Canadian provinces, which until only recent-
ly were not obligated to recognize each other’s judgments, ap-
plied a reciprocity principle similar to that of the German 
courts.109 
American and Canadian courts can learn to effectively al-
locate and address transboundary pollution cases. In order to 
do so, however, they must first revise the jurisdictional pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality. 
II.  POTENTIAL JURISDICTIONAL BARRIERS TO UNITED 
STATES OR CANADIAN NATIONAL COURT ACTION IN 
CASES INVOLVING TRANSBOUNDARY WATER 
POLLUTION   
The courts of the United States and Canada have the pow-
er to develop private international law doctrines that fairly al-
locate environmental cases.110 In order to accomplish this task, 
however, courts will have to address two jurisdictional doc-
trines. The first is the doctrine of personal jurisdiction, which 
determines when it is appropriate for a court to exercise juris-
diction over a transboundary defendant.111 Both countries use a 
contacts-based approach. While United States courts examine 
the relationship of the defendant to the forum,112 Canadian 
courts hold the forum’s relationship to the case being litigated 
as determinative.113 
 
 107. Case 26/69, Stauder v. Ulm, 1969 E.C.R. 419, 419–30. 
 108. Martinez, supra note 44, at 453. 
 109. See Morguard Invs. Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, 1091–94 
(Can.). 
 110. National court litigation is not preempted by the Boundary Waters 
Treaty, so national courts are entitled to decide such cases. See Boundary Wa-
ters Treaty, supra note 5, art. IX (denying the IJC the power to issue binding 
decisions); Manitoba v. Norton, 398 F. Supp. 2d 41, 51 n.10 (D.D.C. 2005) (re-
jecting the argument that the Boundary Waters Treaty preempts a national 
court claim). 
 111. See Parrish, supra note 99, at 3–5. 
 112. To acquire personal jurisdiction over absent persons, a court in the 
United States must first be satisfied that there are sufficient “minimum con-
tacts” between the individual and the state and that the exercise of jurisdic-
tion will not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” 
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 113. See Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1087–91. 
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The other jurisdictional doctrine presents greater difficul-
ty. The presumption against extraterritoriality puts at issue 
the power of a court to apply national environmental statutes 
to transboundary defendants.114 Unfortunately, the presump-
tion is imperfectly calibrated and allows defendants such as 
Teck Cominco and North Dakota to externalize costs or risks 
across the border unless a court rationalizes a territorial appli-
cation of the statute. The contorted reasoning of such cases is 
sometimes met with skepticism on the other side of the bor-
der.115 As the courts of one country rely on the courts of the 
other to implement extraterritorial judgments, such skepticism 
presents an obstacle to effectively addressing cross-border legal 
issues. If a foreign court is suspicious of the reasoning in a de-
cision, it may find reasons not to respect and enforce that deci-
sion. 
A. PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER ALIEN DEFENDANTS 
Historically, the power of a court to exercise in personam 
jurisdiction over a nonresident was limited by the presence or 
absence of the defendant within the forum’s territory.116 How-
ever, the growing interconnection of nations—and their states 
or provinces—prompted the adoption of rules in both the Unit-
ed States and Canada that focus on those connections. In the 
United States, this transition began during the middle of the 
twentieth century and the case law on the subject had largely 
stabilized by the end of the century.117 In Canada, however, the 
transition to a connection-oriented law of personal jurisdiction 
only began in the last twenty years,118 and the full impact of 
the shift remains to be seen. The exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion over transboundary polluters is permissible under the doc-
trines of both countries. 
 
 114. See Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Can. v. Cana-
dian Ass’n of Internet Providers (SOCAN ), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427, 454 (Can.). 
 115. See Lloyd’s Underwriters v. Cominco Ltd., [2006] 12 W.W.R. 486, 497 
(B.C.S.C.) (Can.) (reserving judgment on the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in 
Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2006)), aff’d, 
[2007] 7 W.W.R. 281 (B.C. Ct. App.). 
 116. Parrish, supra note 99, at 8–9. 
 117. See id. at 12–18 (describing this transition). 
 118. Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, Canada’s International Shoe, was on-
ly decided in 1990, and this Note will observe how it has impacted Canadian 
law regarding the recognition of foreign judgments, personal jurisdiction, and 
extraterritoriality.  
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1. Personal Jurisdiction in the United States 
To acquire limited jurisdiction over absent persons, a court 
in the United States must first satisfy itself that there are suf-
ficient “minimum contacts” between the individual and the 
state and that “traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice” will not be offended by the exercise of that jurisdic-
tion.119 This test is applied without reference to the sovereignty 
interests of another forum, either within or outside the United 
States. Rather, the test is guided only by the due process rights 
of the defendant.120 Furthermore, the defendant does not need 
to have been present in the forum state. If the defendant “pur-
posefully directed” his conduct towards the forum to the extent 
that he could reasonably expect to be sued there, then his pres-
ence or absence is irrelevant.121  
2. Personal Jurisdiction in Canada 
Canada’s adoption of a more expansive concept of personal 
jurisdiction is more recent and less settled than that of the 
United States. Like much of Canadian jurisdictional doctrine, it 
derives from the notion of comity, which encourages courts to 
recognize the decisions of foreign jurisdictions whenever possi-
ble.122 
In Canada, unlike in the United States, there is no Full 
Faith and Credit Clause that requires the courts of one prov-
 
 119. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). While the ex-
tent of a federal court’s jurisdiction over an absent defendant is governed by 
the rules imposed by the state in which it sits, FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A), many 
states have long-arm statutes which permit their courts to extend their reach 
as far as is constitutionally permitted. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 
(West 2003) (“A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not 
inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.”). For 
the purposes of this general discussion of American personal jurisdiction, it is 
assumed that such a statute would be applicable. 
 120. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 
702 (1982) (holding that personal jurisdiction is not “a matter of sovereignty, 
but [is] a matter of individual liberty,” and finding the exercise of personal ju-
risdiction over a foreign defendant proper). 
 121. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (quoting 
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
 122. Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1096 (“‘Comity’ . . . . is the recognition 
which one nation allows within its territory to the . . . acts of another nation, 
having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the 
rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its 
laws . . . .” (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895))). 
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ince to recognize the judgments of another.123 However, binding 
precedent from the British Privy Council, using the principle of 
comity, mandated that courts recognize foreign judgments in 
cases initiated while the defendant was in the territory of the 
foreign sovereign.124 The rule was imported directly into Cana-
dian law and governed the way provinces—seen as separate 
nations under private international law—treated each other’s 
judgments.125 As the rule did not provide for the recognition of 
in personam judgments against absent foreign defendants, its 
application in a federal system proved problematic.126 All that 
was required to escape the enforcement of a contract signed in 
one province was to move to another.127 It was such a case that 
prompted the Canadian Supreme Court to alter Canada’s juris-
diction rules in Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye.128 
Morguard established a more expansive view of personal 
jurisdiction. It held that comity requires courts to recognize 
judgments issued by foreign courts that had personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant.129 To this end, Morguard held that 
personal jurisdiction could be exercised where there is a “real 
and substantial connection” between the forum and the suit.130 
This approach, the Morguard court believed, would adequately 
balance the plaintiff ’s interest in suing in the forum of his 
choice with the hardship suffered by a defendant sued outside 
his home province.131 
 
 123. Id. at 1100; see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit 
shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceed-
ings of every other State.”). But see Hunt v. T&N plc, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289, 322–
23 (Can.) (inferring a full faith and credit requirement from the structure of 
the Canadian Constitution although there is no explicit clause). 
 124. See Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1087–88, 1091–92. 
 125. Id. at 1091–92. 
 126. See id. at 1087 (framing the issue to be decided along these terms). 
 127. See id. at 1091–92. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See id. at 1103–04 (finding no difficulty in recognizing judgments 
where a foreign court has acted within the “ground[s] traditionally accepted 
. . . as permitting the recognition . . . of foreign judgments,” but going on to 
struggle with the extent to which “a court of a province [may] properly exercise 
jurisdiction over a defendant in another province”); id. at 1107 (“[I]f this Court 
thinks it inherently reasonable for a court to exercise jurisdiction . . . it would 
be odd indeed if it did not also consider it reasonable for the courts of another 
province to recognize and enforce that court’s judgment.”). 
 130. Id. at 1109. 
 131. Id. 
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Subsequent case law continues to apply the Morguard test 
and expand its reach.132 In 1993, Hunt v. T&N plc constitution-
alized the holding, explaining that Canada’s federal structure 
permitted provinces to extend their jurisdictional reach into 
sister provinces.133 Earlier that same year, Amchem Products, 
Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board) inter-
nationalized the holding.134 That case incorporated the “real 
and substantial connection” test into Canadian forum non con-
veniens law.135 Under the rule announced, a court must dismiss 
a suit under the doctrine of forum non conveniens if there is a 
“more appropriate jurisdiction” to try the case.136 As articulated 
by the court, the “real and substantial connection” test should 
be used to determine whether there is a more appropriate fo-
rum.137 The presence of the defendant and the location where 
service is rendered are no longer relevant considerations under 
Canadian law.138 Although it has evolved along a different 
path, Canada’s personal jurisdiction law is now capable of 
reaching as far as that of its longer-established American 
neighbor. 
3. Acquiring Personal Jurisdiction over a Transboundary 
Polluter 
A transboundary polluter like Teck Cominco, which dis-
charges vast amounts of waste into a river throughout most of 
 
 132. Desjean v. Intermix Media, Inc., [2006] 57 C.P.R.4th 314, 322–23 
(Fed. Ct.) (Can.) (listing Canadian Supreme Court and Ontario cases that have 
applied this test). 
 133. [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289, 322–23 (Can.). 
 134. [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897, 920–21 (Can.). 
 135. See id. at 916–17, 919–21. In the United States, forum non conveniens 
is applied where an alternative forum exists and where “trial in the chosen 
forum would ‘establish . . . oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant . . . out 
of all proportion to plaintiff ’s convenience,’” or when the “‘court’s own adminis-
trative and legal problems’” militate against the exercise of jurisdiction. Piper 
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981) (quoting Koster v. Lumber-
mens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947)). This doctrine does not present 
a problem for United States-Canadian transboundary environmental litigation 
because the forums are close to each other, and the laws to be applied are sim-
ilar. See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-256-AAM, 2004 
WL 2578982, at *4 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2004) (disposing of objections to the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction on these grounds), aff’d, 452 F.3d 1066 (9th 
Cir. 2006), petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2007) (No. 
06-1188). 
 136. Amchem, [1993] 1 S.C.R. at 920–21. 
 137. See id. 
 138. Id. 
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a century,139 should not be surprised when the river carries the 
waste downstream into another forum. Knowledge that the riv-
er will run its course is enough to satisfy the purposeful direc-
tion test of American personal jurisdiction law.140 Canadian law 
would also quickly dispose of a challenge to personal jurisdic-
tion as there is a “real and substantial connection” between the 
cause of action and the forum seeking to exercise jurisdiction.141 
However, the ability to exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant is meaningless if a court is not also able to exercise 
subject matter jurisdiction. The presumption against extrater-
ritoriality may strip a court of such jurisdiction and is thus 
another obstacle to courts hearing transboundary pollution 
cases. 
B. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND 
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
Both the United States and Canadian federal legislatures 
claim the power to legislate beyond the territorial limits of 
their respective countries.142 However, both legislatures are 
presumed not to exercise this power unless they state their in-
tent to do so.143 This is known as the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. An examination of extraterritoriality case 
law, however, reveals exceptions that provide a basis for the 
general application of environmental statutes to transboundary 
polluters. 
1. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality in the United 
States 
The American presumption against extraterritoriality is an 
old rule, but has been recently revived by the Supreme 
 
 139. Pakootas, 2004 WL 2578982, at *3. 
 140. Id.; see also Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1072 (noting that Teck Cominco did 
not challenge the personal jurisdiction ruling of the trial court on appeal). 
 141. See United States v. Ivey, [1996] 30 O.R.3d 370, 374–75 (Ont. Ct. 
App.) (Can.) (recognizing, for these reasons, an American court’s judgment 
against an absent Canadian defendant). 
 142. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) 
(citing Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284–85 (1949)); Statute of West-
minster, 1931, 22 Geo. 5, c. 4, § 3 (Eng.) (granting that power to the Canadian 
Parliament). 
 143. See Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 284–85; Soc’y of Composers, Authors & 
Music Publishers of Can. v. Canadian Ass’n of Internet Providers (SOCAN ), 
[2004] 2 S.C.R. 427, 454 (Can.). 
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Court.144 Federal circuit courts struggling with the presump-
tion have developed two exceptions to defeat the presumption 
in cases with American ties.145 One exception provides that the 
presumption does not apply where the conduct giving rise to a 
case occurred within the United States.146 The other applies 
where the adverse effects of such conduct are felt within the 
United States.147 These exceptions are controversial, and there 
is disagreement as to whether one, both, or neither is valid. 
a. Development of the Rule 
The presumption against extraterritoriality first gained 
ground in the United States with American Banana Co. v. 
United Fruit Co., a suit in which an American fruit company 
attempted to recover damages under the Sherman Antitrust 
Act for the monopolistic conduct in Columbia of a rival Ameri-
can company.148 In dismissing the suit, Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr. articulated what would become the foundation for 
later jurisprudence on the presumption against extraterrito-
riality.149 His argument was based on strict considerations of 
territorial sovereignty and on the respect that nations, as sove-
reign equals, owed each other.150 He believed that “[f]or anoth-
er jurisdiction . . . to treat [a party] according to its own notions 
rather than those of the place where he did the acts . . . would 
be an interference with the authority of another sovereign.”151 
While Justice Holmes admitted that Congress did have the 
competence to legislate beyond the borders of the United 
States,152 he believed that courts should approach statutes cau-
tiously and, “in case of doubt,” should construct statutes “as in-
tended to be confined in [their] operation and effect to the terri-
 
 144. See William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extra-
territoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 85–86 (1998). 
 145. See Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 
1993). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. 213 U.S. 347, 353–55 (1909). 
 149. See Dodge, supra note 144, at 85–86 (describing the early history of 
the presumption against extraterritoriality). 
 150. For example, see American Banana, 213 U.S. at 358, where Justice 
Holmes uses the same principles to develop the “act of state doctrine,” which 
requires American courts to refrain from passing judgment on the legality of 
the acts of foreign sovereigns. 
 151. Id. at 356. 
 152. See id. (citing, as an example, federal criminal statutes governing cor-
respondence with foreign governments). 
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torial limits over which the lawmaker has general and legiti-
mate power.”153 
While it seemed for a time that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality had fallen into disfavor,154 the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed the doctrine in EEOC v. Arabian American 
Oil Co. (Aramco).155 In Aramco, the Court again conceded that 
Congress can legislate extraterritorially, but held that judicial 
actors should operate under the assumption that legislation is 
passed to address domestic concerns.156 The Court justified the 
presumption by observing that it “serves to protect against un-
intended clashes between our laws and those of other nations 
which could result in international discord.”157 
Under the modern doctrine, United States courts faced 
with an example case must go through a two-stage inquiry.158 
First, the court must examine the facts of the case to determine 
whether they require the extraterritorial application of a sta-
tute.159 If it does, then the court is required to perform analysis 
under the presumption.160 The presumption is not restricted to 
statutes regulating conduct, to those creating a right of action, 
or to any other similar category of statutes.161 Second, if the 
court concludes that the presumption is applicable, it must de-
termine whether Congress intended the statute to apply extra-
territorially.162 This does not amount, however, to a “clear 
statement rule.”163 Courts can find intent by examining legisla-
tive history or through the use of other interpretive means.164 
The rule, however, remains a barrier to the extraterritorial ap-
plication of a statute, because a failure to overcome the pre-
 
 153. Id. at 357. 
 154. Dodge, supra note 144, at 87. 
 155. 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See, e.g., In re Maxwell Commc’n Corp., 186 B.R. 807, 815 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995), aff’d, 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 159. See, e.g., id. at 815–16 (“First, a court must determine if the presump-
tion applies at all: after identifying the conduct proscribed or regulated by the 
particular legislation in question, a court must consider if that conduct oc-
curred outside of the borders of the U.S.”). 
 160. See id. 
 161. See Urlic v. Am. Int’l Group, No. 96 Civ. 1177(LBS), 1997 WL 223076, 
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 1997) (rejecting the argument that the presumption on-
ly applies to statutes regulating conduct). 
 162. E.g., In re Maxwell Commc’n Corp., 186 B.R. at 816. 
 163. See Kollias v. D&G Marine Maint., 29 F.3d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 164. Id. 
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sumption results in dismissal for lack of subject matter juris-
diction.165 
b. Exceptions to the Presumption 
The application of the presumption against extraterrito-
riality may be reasonable where a court is faced with a request 
to apply domestic law to cases where both the conduct and the 
effects of that conduct occur beyond the territorial jurisdiction 
of the United States.166 Some courts, however, have dismissed 
the argument that cases with a substantial connection to the 
United States implicate the presumption.167 Slowly, this reac-
tion has led to the piecemeal adoption of two exceptions to the 
presumption: the “conduct” and the “effects” exceptions.168 They 
first arose in the area of antitrust169 and securities cases170 be-
fore appearing in bankruptcy171 and, finally, environmental 
cases.172 
The conduct exception applies when the “conduct regulated 
by the government occurs within the United States.”173 The ef-
fects exception, on the other hand, applies where the “failure to 
extend the scope of the statute to a foreign setting will result in 
adverse effects within the United States.”174 
 
 165. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 247, 259 
(1991) (affirming a finding by the trial court that it lacked subject matter ju-
risdiction because the presumption against extraterritoriality had not been 
overcome). 
 166. See Urlic, 1997 WL 223076, at *3 (applying the presumption against 
extraterritoriality to bar an insurance claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1364 for an au-
tomobile accident that occurred abroad). 
 167. The Ninth Circuit has taken this approach: 
Certainly the doctrine of territorial sovereignty is not such an artifi-
cial limit on the vindication of legitimate sovereign interests that the 
injured state confronts the wrong side of a one-way glass, powerless to 
counteract harmful effects originating outside its boundaries which 
easily pierce its “sovereign” walls, while its own regulatory efforts are 
reflected back in its face.  
Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 923 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984). 
 168. See Robinson v. TCI/US W. Cable Commc’ns Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 905 
(5th Cir. 1997). 
 169. See Dodge, supra note 144, at 87. 
 170. See Robinson, 117 F.3d at 905. 
 171. See In re Maxwell Commc’n Corp., 186 B.R. 807, 816–17 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995), aff’d, 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 172. See, e.g., Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 
1993). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
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Federal circuits are split as to the proper application of 
these two exceptions. Some jurisdictions recognize the conduct 
exception, while declining to apply the effects exception.175 
Other jurisdictions advocate for the opposite position,176 while 
some jurisdictions apply both exceptions.177 Some jurisdictions 
even limit the application of an exception to particular statutes 
or types of statutes.178 If one of the exceptions is applicable, 
however, it precludes further analysis under the presumption 
against extraterritoriality, and the court does not proceed to 
statutory analysis.179 This abbreviated analysis thus permits 
courts deciding transboundary cases to apply statutes that 
would not survive legislative intent analysis under the pre-
sumption.180 
Each exception is derived from an inference as to congres-
sional motives. The proponents of a conduct exception draw 
upon a classical understanding of sovereignty and power.181 
Such arguments first appeared in American Banana.182 In that 
 
 175. See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1096–
97 (9th Cir. 1994); see also In re Maxwell Commc’n Corp., 186 B.R. at 821 
(finding it “unclear if the domestic ‘effects’ of foreign conduct, in the absence of 
Congressional direction that a statute be applied to such conduct, is sufficient 
to render the presumption inapplicable”). 
 176. See Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(arguing that Congress does not normally legislate with the foreign effects of 
domestic conduct in mind); Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 
668, 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (refusing to apply the conduct test, but proceeding 
directly to an investigation of the legislative history); see also Dodge, supra 
note 144, at 124 (advocating for the general adoption of this position). 
 177. The D.C. Circuit adopted this position in Massey, 986 F.2d at 531, and 
the Fifth Circuit has also applied it in Robinson v. TCI/US West Cable Com-
munications Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 905 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 178. Compare Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 
1075–76 (9th Cir. 2006) (carefully classifying the environmental conduct as 
local and thus avoiding precedent which refuses to recognize the effects excep-
tion), petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2007) (No. 06-
1188), with In re Simon, 153 F.3d 991, 995 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Massey, 
986 F.2d at 531, in order to apply the effects doctrine to a bankruptcy case).  
 179. See, e.g., In re Maxwell Commc’n Corp., 186 B.R. at 816 (placing the 
conduct exception in the first stage of analysis under the presumption). 
 180. See In re French, 320 B.R. 78, 85 (D. Md. 2004), aff’d, 440 F.3d 145 
(4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 72 (2006) (exempting from scrutiny, as 
an alternative holding, the Bankruptcy Code); Goodman v. Lee, No. 85-2966, 
1994 WL 710738, at *3–4 (E.D. La. Dec. 20, 1994) (deciding that the Copyright 
Act would apply regardless of the presumption). 
 181. See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1096–
97 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting the principle of territoriality in an international or-
der populated with independent sovereignties). 
 182. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357–58 (1909). 
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case, Justice Holmes stated that congressional legislation regu-
lating conduct was primarily “addressed to persons living with-
in the power of the courts.”183 This idea has been adopted by 
courts that recognize the conduct exception and, as a result, de-
cline invitations to apply the presumption against extraterrito-
riality to bar cases involving conduct occurring within the 
United States.184 
Proponents of the effects exception, on the other hand, ar-
gue that Congress is not much concerned with regulating the 
conduct of those within the United States, but with protecting 
Americans.185 Under this theory, Congress intends domestic 
legislation to address not only domestic conduct, but also the 
adverse domestic effects of foreign conduct.186 
In either case, the exceptions to the presumption apply on-
ly when the conduct or effect is significant enough to make the 
suit truly “domestic.”187 Circuits disagree, however, as to the 
stringency of the threshold requirements necessary to prove 
that the application of an exception is appropriate.188 This dis-
pute as to what makes a statutory application “extraterritorial” 
has led one scholar to propose that extraterritoriality be ex-
amined along a “continuum of context.”189  
 
 183. Id. at 356–57. 
 184. See, e.g., Goodman, 1994 WL 710738, at *4 (“These acts . . . took place 
in the United States. Therefore, even if defendants’ acts constituted an in-
fringement, plaintiff ’s claims would be actionable under the copyright law, 
and plaintiff would be entitled to recover the foreign royalties derived from 
defendants’ fraudulent concealment.”). 
 185. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 
F.2d 909, 923 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (arguing that territorial sovereignty allowed for 
the “vindication of legitimate sovereign interests,” such as domestic harm, 
even when the conduct infringing on those interests occurs abroad). 
 186. See id. (“[L]egislation to protect domestic economic interests can legi-
timately reach conduct occurring outside the legislating territory intended to 
damage the protected interests within the territory.”). 
 187. Robinson v. TCI/US W. Cable Commc’ns Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 906 (5th 
Cir. 1997). 
 188. See id. at 905–06 (describing the different tests for the conduct excep-
tion); see also Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 923 (describing the effects exception 
as being applicable “[a]s long as the territorial effects are not so inconsequen-
tial as to exceed the bounds of reasonableness imposed by international law”). 
 189. Randall S. Abate, Dawn of a New Era in the Extraterritorial Applica-
tion of U.S. Environmental Statutes: A Proposal for an Integrated Judicial 
Standard Based on the Continuum of Context, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 87, 130 
(2006). 
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c. The Continuum of Context 
In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, the court 
justified the application of NEPA to an American project in  
Antarctica based on the fact that Antarctica is a global com-
mons over which no national government exercises sovereign-
ty.190 Some courts have since picked up on this sovereignty-
based factor in their own decisions.191 Professor Randall S. Ab-
ate recently proposed analyzing the extraterritorial application 
of United States environmental statutes within a “continuum of 
context” based on Massey’s rule.192 Professor Abate argued that 
the degree of sovereignty that the United States exercises over 
the territory in which the case arises should determine how ap-
propriate it is for a court to apply a national environmental sta-
tute to that case.193 He believes that this sovereignty interest is 
strongest when the event occurs within American territory, 
weakens as it moves into a global commons, and finally disap-
pears entirely within the sovereign territory of another coun-
try.194 Applying his theory, Professor Abate argued that Pakoo-
tas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd.195 was improperly decided 
because the Trail smelter was located in a foreign sovereign 
territory.196 
2. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality in Canada 
While Canadian provinces are constitutionally prohibited 
from legislating extraterritorially,197 the federal parliament has 
the authority to do so.198 Canada’s presumption against extra-
territoriality is closely related to the line of cases that devel-
oped the nation’s modern personal jurisdiction doctrine. The 
 
 190. See 986 F.2d 528, 533–34 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 191. See United States v. Corey, 232 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2000); Basel 
Action Network v. Mar. Admin., 370 F. Supp. 2d 57, 71–72 (D.D.C. 2005); 
NEPA Coal. of Japan v. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. 466, 467 (D.D.C. 1993). 
 192. See Abate, supra note 189, at 130. 
 193. Id. at 103–04. 
 194. Id. 
 195. No. CV-04-256-AAM, 2004 WL 2578982 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2004), 
aff’d, 452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2006), petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3483 
(U.S. Feb. 27, 2007) (No. 06-1188). 
 196. Abate, supra note 189, at 130–34. 
 197. See Unifund Assurance Co. v. Ins. Corp. of B.C., [2003] 2 S.C.R. 63, 88 
(Can.) (interpreting the Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3, § 92 
(U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5 (Appendix 1985)). 
 198. Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 Geo. 5, c. 4, § 3 (Eng.) (“It is hereby 
declared and enacted that the Parliament of a Dominion has full power to 
make laws having extra-territorial operation.”). 
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doctrine made its first appearance in Society of Composers, Au-
thors & Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Association of 
Internet Providers (SOCAN), where the Canadian Supreme 
Court held that Parliament “is presumed not to intend to [give 
a statute extraterritorial effect] in the absence of clear words or 
necessary implication to the contrary.”199 However, SOCAN did 
not actually examine the text of the copyright statute or its leg-
islative history before deciding that it could be given extraterri-
torial effect.200 The court instead cited Morguard and its proge-
ny for the proposition that a “real and substantial connection to 
Canada is sufficient to support the [extraterritorial] application 
of [the statute] . . . in a way that will accord with international 
comity and be consistent with the objectives of order and fair-
ness.”201 The court then proceeded to find that the require-
ments of the test had been met.202 
While it may be argued that this demonstrates that the 
court’s articulation of a presumption against extraterritoriality 
was merely an empty threat, it is also possible to interpret 
SOCAN as the application of an exception to the presumption 
similar to those found in the United States. The court referred 
to a case holding that transboundary criminal fraud occurs si-
multaneously “here and there” rather than being limited to one 
or neither jurisdiction.203 The application of this principle in 
SOCAN suggests that Canada may recognize a doctrine similar 
to the American conduct and effects exceptions to the presump-
tion against extraterritoriality and that its courts will go 
through a similar two-stage process in applying the presump-
tion.204 However, jumping to such conclusions would be prema-
ture, as it assumes an established Canadian doctrine. 
The fact that the court in SOCAN does not cite any author-
ity for the existence of a presumption205 implies that the 
SOCAN decision created the Canadian presumption against 
extraterritoriality. This inference is strengthened by the way in 
which the court justifies the presumption through principles 
 
 199. See [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427, 454 (Can.). 
 200. See id. at 454–56. 
 201. Id. at 456. 
 202. See id. 
 203. Id. at 455 (quoting Libman v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178, 208 
(Can.)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 204. See In re Maxwell Commc’n Corp., 186 B.R. 807, 815–16 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995) (outlining the two-step process used by American courts when a case 
raises extraterritoriality concerns), aff’d, 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 205. See SOCAN, [2004] 2 S.C.R. at 454. 
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only developed in recent cases206 and by the fact that pre-
Morguard Canadian courts operated under more restrictive 
personal jurisdiction rules.207 Further, neither of the two cases 
that cite to SOCAN ’s presumption acknowledge any other 
source for the language.208 The court’s creation of the presump-
tion against extraterritoriality in SOCAN may indicate that it 
is preparing to set limits to the vague “real and substantial 
connection” test established in Morguard.209 
III.  USING NATIONAL COURTS TO CONTROL 
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER POLLUTION   
The international dispute mechanisms currently in place 
are unable to address the movement of environmental harm 
across the United States-Canadian border. Further, the bila-
teral environmental relationship of the two countries makes an 
adequate public international law solution to this problem un-
likely. Therefore, American and Canadian courts must collabo-
ratively craft a set of procedural rules which allocate trans-
boundary water cases to the appropriate forum. 
These procedural mechanisms will increase the environ-
mental health of both countries by allowing private parties to 
bring lawsuits against transboundary polluters. The threat of 
potentially costly penalties will cause polluters to consider less 
damaging options.210 Furthermore, as in a multilateral interna-
tional setting, private parties who sue transboundary polluters 
will represent the broader population harmed by the externali-
zation of environmental costs.211 
The continuum of context theory proposed by Professor 
Abate is a good place to begin crafting the necessary procedural 
 
 206. See id. 
 207. See Morguard Invs. Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, 1091–93 
(Can.). 
 208. See Sutcliffe v. R., [2006] 2 C.T.C. 2267, 2290–91 (Can. Tax Ct. 2005); 
In re Smith, [2005] 12 C.B.R.5th 39, 50 (N.W.T.) (Can.). Indeed, the Sutcliffe 
court appeared unsure of what to do with SOCAN ’s language, seeming to imp-
ly that the language is merely a different way of phrasing “real and substan-
tial connection.” See Sutcliffe, [2006] 2 C.T.C. at 2291. 
 209. This would reverse the court’s earlier reluctance to do so. See Hunt v. 
T&N plc, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289, 325–26 (Can.) (declining to adopt a broad or 
narrow interpretation of the “real and substantial connection” test). 
 210. See Maria E. Chang, Citizen Suits: Toward a Workable Solution to 
Help Created Wetlands Succeed, 6 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 85 (1993) (de-
scribing the primary purpose of citizen suits as “deterrence”). 
 211. Id. at 86 (noting that citizens who bring citizen suits are “vindicating 
public rights” through their actions). 
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regime. While Professor Abate’s argument that the propriety of 
bypassing the presumption can be seen along a continuum is 
convincing, the continuum he proposes is inadequate for trans-
boundary cases. Professor Abate’s continuum focuses on the so-
vereignty over specific categories of territories and assumes 
that an event will be limited in both “conduct” and “effect” to 
one of the three categories on his continuum.212 Because trans-
boundary events like Pakootas encompass territories that fall 
on opposite ends of Abate’s continuum,213 a more appropriate 
formulation would use the physical geographical context of the 
event as an axis on the continuum to measure the propriety of 
bypassing the presumption. Furthermore, the temporal context 
of the case should also form an axis on the continuum of con-
text because some transboundary cases, such as Manitoba v. 
Norton, involve the potential of future harm,214 while others, 
such as Pakootas, involve harm that has already taken place.215 
In addition to recalibrating the presumption against extraterri-
toriality, judges within the United States should be aware that 
their opinions will have a foreign audience. They should under-
stand that Canadian judges will read American opinions close-
ly,216 and they should also pay attention to the signals conveyed 
to them via foreign opinions. 
 
 212. See Abate, supra note 189, at 104. 
 213. Part of the Pakootas case, the effects, falls within the territory of the 
United States, which forms one end of the Abate continuum. See Pakootas v. 
Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1069–70 (9th Cir. 2006), petition 
for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2007) (No. 06-1188); Abate, su-
pra note 189, at 104. However, the conduct which gave rise to Pakootas oc-
curred in Canada which, as a “sovereign foreign territor[y],” falls on the other 
end of the Abate continuum. See Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1069; Abate, supra note 
189, at 104. 
 214. See Manitoba v. Norton, 398 F. Supp. 2d 41, 44 (D.D.C. 2005) (stating 
that construction on the water transfer project at issue had just begun). 
 215. See Pakootas, 453 F.3d at 1068 (indicating that the hazardous waste 
had already been dumped). 
 216. See, e.g., Amchem Prods. Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers’ Comp. 
Bd.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897, 927 (Can.) (reading Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 
Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937–38 (D.C. Cir. 1984), very closely for 
clues as to how American courts would react to a Canadian jurisdictional as-
sertion). 
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A. THE CONTINUUM OF CONTEXT IS NOT A QUESTION OF 
SOVEREIGNTY 
1. The Territorial Context of Events—Territorial, 
Interterritorial, and Extraterritorial 
Supporters of the exclusive application of a conduct excep-
tion to the presumption against extraterritoriality argue that 
Congress legislates according to the expectation that its sta-
tutes will regulate conduct that occurs within its territory.217 
On the other hand, those who argue for an exclusive effects ex-
ception to the presumption believe that the primary purpose of 
legislation is to protect those who are present within the legis-
lating territory.218 Both positions, however, suffer from a logical 
fallacy. They each assume that these interpretations of con-
gressional intent are mutually exclusive. Congress, however, 
legislates with both intentions. The vast majority of legislation 
regulates domestic conduct to prevent harmful domestic effects. 
In other words, legislation should be examined under the “as-
sumption that Congress . . . is primarily concerned with domes-
tic conditions,”219 which is broader than a narrow conduct- or 
effects-based test. 
The problem, then, becomes one of appropriately defining 
“domestic conditions.” An appropriate definition should incor-
porate both the conduct and effect tests. The transboundary 
events that give rise to statutory causes of action are intimately 
tied to domestic conditions. Domestic conduct that gives rise to 
an interterritorial event is the result of domestic conditions 
that encourage such conduct, and the goal of domestic legisla-
tion is to discourage that conduct.220 At the same time, the ef-
fects of such events have a negative impact on domestic condi-
tions that the legislature desires to prevent.221 Thus, the target 
of legislative action includes both conduct and effects—it is the 
 
 217. See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1095–
97 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 218. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975) 
(asking whether “Congress would have wished the precious resources of Unit-
ed States courts” to be devoted to predominantly foreign problems). 
 219. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (emphasis added). 
 220. See Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1091–92 (framing the question of liability—
and the application of the conduct exception—on whether the conduct which 
Congress targeted with a copyright statute was the authorization of infringing 
acts or the infringing acts themselves). 
 221. See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 923 (arguing that sovereign states leg-
islate in order to protect themselves and that an “entire transaction is not . . . 
immunized” by the fact that the causes of domestic harm occurred abroad). 
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interterritorial event in its entirety, even if one component of 
that event is located across a border.222 This concept is particu-
larly applicable to environmental cases more so than to the 
bankruptcy and antitrust cases, two areas of law that have ap-
plied the conduct and effects exceptions. 
Unlike financial cases, where electronic transfers between 
legal-fiction entities can instantaneously travel anywhere in 
the world, environmental events are grounded in physical geog-
raphy. In a sense, they have their own territorial boundaries. 
One can take a map and pencil, for example, and determine the 
geographical extent of the Pakootas case. It begins at Trail, 
British Columbia, extends downstream through the Upper Co-
lumbia River and Lake Roosevelt, and finally terminates at the 
Grand Coulee Dam.223 This exercise reveals that the Pakootas 
event is extraterritorial to neither the United States nor Cana-
da. It is instead “interterritorial” to both countries, much like 
the river it affected. 
Indeed, courts struggling with the presumption against 
extraterritoriality have approached this “interterritorial” un-
derstanding of events, but have yet to express it. For example, 
in applying the presumption against extraterritoriality, courts 
must first examine whether the conduct or effects exceptions 
are applicable.224 Alternatively, this threshold inquiry could 
ask whether the presumption is applicable at all. If an event is 
not extraterritorial, then the presumption should not be ap-
plied.225 Because an interterritorial event occupies space within 
the borders of a state, the application of that state’s laws to it is 
not extraterritorial and the presumption is not implicated. 
Thus, the second step in extraterritoriality analysis need not be 
reached, and the text of an ambiguous environmental statute 
need not be subjected to scrutiny for extraterritorial intent.226 
 
 222. See Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Can. v. Cana-
dian Ass’n of Internet Providers (SOCAN ), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427, 455 (Can.) (ar-
guing that the events that lead to transboundary litigation occur in both juris-
dictions—i.e., they arise both “here and there” (quoting Libman v. The Queen, 
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 178, 208 (Can.)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 223. Robinson-Dorn, supra note 16, at 263–65 (laying out the geography of 
the Upper Columbia River). 
 224. See, e.g., In re Maxwell Commc’n Corp., 186 B.R. 807, 816 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995) (asserting that a case involving conduct within the United States does 
not involve the extraterritorial application of American law), aff’d, 93 F.3d 
1036 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 225. Id. at 815–16. 
 226. This does not, however, mean that a statute explicitly limiting itself to 
territorial application should be applied to an interterritorial event. Instead, 
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The challenge, rather, is to determine whether to allocate the 
case to a United States or a Canadian court. 
Determining the territorial context of an event alone, how-
ever, does not solve the problem of allocation. Because an inter-
territorial case has a geographical breadth that extends into 
more than one nation, more than one nation has a claim to ju-
risdiction over it. The temporal context of the event will deter-
mine the appropriate allocation of the dispute. 
2. The Temporal Context of Events—Sovereign Power over 
Cause and Effect 
Events do not only have physical boundaries; they also 
have temporal boundaries. They have a beginning, a middle, 
and an end. Lawsuits may be initiated at any of these three 
points. The physical boundaries of an event shift over time as 
the event unfolds. This is significant for the purposes of allocat-
ing jurisdiction over such suits. Once again, Pakootas is a good 
illustration of this concept. When the Trail smelter began to 
dump slag into the Upper Columbia River, the Pakootas event 
existed only at the dump site.227 As the event continued to de-
velop, it encompassed the dump site, the flow of the slag into 
Lake Roosevelt, and the buildup of waste behind the Grand 
Coulee Dam.228 Finally, once the smelter ceased dumping, the 
event reached its end state, where remaining slag was washed 
into Lake Roosevelt.229 
This scenario demonstrates that as the temporal context of 
the event changed, so did the territorial context. Initially, the 
event was territorial to Canada and extraterritorial to the 
United States. It then became interterritorial to both countries 
and ultimately extraterritorial to Canada and territorial to the 
United States. Thus, in the initial stage of the event, the appli-
cation of an American statute such as NEPA would have been 
 
the assumption is merely inverted, and interterritorial events are targeted by 
statutes absent evidence of contrary intent. For example, North Dakota’s wa-
ter quality statute limits itself to protecting the “waters of the state.” N.D. 
ADMIN. CODE 33-16-02.1-02 (2001) (emphasis added). The North Dakota legis-
lature has explicitly manifested its intent to target only local adverse effects. 
The clear statement of intent eliminates the need for any presumption as to 
how the legislature wanted a statute to apply, either interterritorially or 
extraterritorially. 
 227. See Robinson-Dorn, supra note 16, at 263–65 (laying out the geogra-
phy of the Upper Columbia River). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
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extraterritorial and would have triggered the presumption.230 
On the other hand, the application of a Canadian equivalent of 
CERCLA during the end stage would also have been extraterri-
torial and triggered the presumption.231 This is because—to use 
the language of American extraterritoriality doctrine—Canada 
had sovereign power over the conduct while the United States 
had sovereign power over the effects. Solving the problem of al-
location, however, requires one further step because there is 
still a period of time during which the event remains interterri-
torial. 
The relative power of two nations over an interterritorial 
event shifts along a continuum defined by the timeline of that 
event. Before the Trail smelter began to dump slag, Canada 
had exclusive control over the event, as no case or controversy 
had yet arisen in the United States. A Canadian court could 
have prevented the event by issuing an injunction under a 
NEPA-like statute, thus barring the smelter from pursuing its 
contemplated course of action. As time passed, however, and 
the smelter began dumping, both countries had the power to 
provide partial relief to the event. Canada could have acted to 
prevent further harm, while the United States could have or-
dered and supervised the cleanup of the environmental harm 
 
 230. NEPA provides a property rule, which means that beneficiaries of the 
rule have the right to block further action by those whose activities are tar-
geted by the rule. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. 
REV. 1089, 1105 (1972) (defining property rules); Bradley C. Karkkainen, To-
ward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government’s Environmen-
tal Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 913–15 (2002) (describing NEPA). 
Thus, the application of a NEPA equivalent would require an American court 
to issue an injunction against a Canadian actor in Canada for conduct having 
no immediate effects within the United States, making such an application of 
the statute wholly extraterritorial. 
 231. CERCLA provides a liability rule, which means that the targeted ac-
tivity cannot be blocked ex ante, but those individuals who violate the rule 
must make amends to individuals harmed by the violation of the rule. See Ro-
nald G. Aronovsky, Back from the Margins: An Environmental Nuisance Pa-
radigm for Private Cleanup Cost Disputes, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 395, 404–05 
(2006) (stating that CERCLA provides for retroactive liability); Calabresi & 
Melamed, supra note 230, at 1105–06 (defining liability rules). What makes 
the extraterritorial application of a CERCLA-like statute problematic is that, 
rather than providing a damages remedy, the polluter is required to coordi-
nate with domestic agencies in cleaning up the environmental damage it 
caused. See Aronovsky, supra, at 404–06 (stating that the EPA may either is-
sue an administrative order directing the owner of a contaminated site to 
clean it, or clean up the site independently and later sue for the costs in-
curred). Under this model, a statutorily designated Canadian agency would be 
required to operate outside of its jurisdiction. 
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that had already occurred. Finally, once dumping had ended, 
and all the slag had flowed into the United States, only Ameri-
can courts had the power to address the event.232 The timeline 
of the Pakootas event thus demonstrates that the “territoriali-
ty” of an environmental event can be allocated based on the 
form of relief available at the time of the lawsuit. 
The operations of American environmental statutes and 
their Canadian cousins enable this allocation to work. Preven-
tative environmental statutes, which could provide the basis for 
injunctive relief, typically require studies, hearings, and super-
vision.233 At the same time, remedial environmental statutes, 
while embracing a polluter pays principle,234 typically do not 
provide for damages. Instead, the polluter contributes directly 
to efforts to clean up the polluted sites.235 In both cases gov-
ernment action and supervision are involved. Thus imposing 
such relief across a national boundary would not only be an af-
front to national sovereignty, but would also be impractical be-
cause there would be no agency infrastructure in place to im-
plement the court’s instructions. 
The proposed allocation of jurisdiction resembles tradition-
al in rem jurisdiction, which allocates exclusive jurisdiction to 
the forum to first acquire jurisdiction over a res.236 By adopting 
a relief-based allocation of jurisdiction over interterritorial en-
 
 232. In some cases, pollution may also remain in the source country. See, 
e.g., Judson Lake Trumpeter Swans, supra note 12 (describing a polluted lake 
that straddles the border). However, this lingering pollution is not a source of 
transboundary litigation and is beyond the scope of this Note because it would 
be addressed in litigation by local plaintiffs against a local defendant in a local 
court.  
 233. See Oliver A. Houck, O Canada!: The Story of Rafferty, Oldman, and 
the Great Whale, 29 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 175, 241 (2006) (“In both [the 
American and Canadian] systems . . . the enforcement of environmental as-
sessment requirements . . . depends on judicial review. . . . [M]ore than one re-
viewing court has ended up with years of supervision over national grazing 
policies, surface mining, and the preservation of the Pacific Salmon.”). 
 234. See PHILLIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 279–80 (2d ed. 2003) (defining the polluter pays prin-
ciple as “the requirement that the costs of pollution should be borne by the 
person responsible for causing the pollution” and discussing the adoption of 
the principle by national governments). 
 235. See Eric Thomas Larson, Note, Why Environmental Liability Regimes 
in the United States, the European Community, and Japan Have Grown Syn-
onymous with the Polluter Pays Principle, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 541, 
553–54 (2005) (describing four different tactics used by the EPA to force pollu-
ters to pay for the cleanup of Superfund sites).  
 236. Cf. R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943, 957 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(describing the operation of in rem jurisdiction). 
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vironmental litigation, United States and Canadian courts 
would avoid the same type of direct conflict that in rem juris-
diction was designed to avoid237 while still maintaining the 
power to regulate the conduct of, and remedy the harms suf-
fered by, their own residents. Indeed, applying this framework 
to Norton and Pakootas reveals that two American statutes al-
ready in place can serve a vital role in ensuring that the border 
does not protect transboundary polluters. 
B. APPLYING THE MODIFIED CONTINUUM OF CONTEXT THEORY 
TO CLOSE THE GAP IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
Because the two exceptions to the presumption against 
extraterritoriality are judicially crafted doctrines,238 they can 
be adapted by the same judiciary that created them to reflect 
new insights into how the rules work in practice and how they 
can be improved. To that end, the analytical tools developed in 
the preceding subsection will now be applied to three recent 
transboundary environmental cases to demonstrate how the 
modified continuum of context might function in practice. 
1. Norton—The Interterritorial Application of NEPA 
The plaintiff in Norton challenged NAWS under a NEPA 
provision that requires that an environmental impact state-
ment (EIS) be issued before any major federal project with the 
potential to “significantly affect[] the quality of the human en-
vironment” may proceed.239 This “‘action-forcing’ procedure[] 
ensure[s] that broad policy concerns regarding environmental 
quality are infused into the actions of the federal govern-
ment.”240 While private parties do not have standing to sue un-
 
 237. Cf. Jennifer M. Anglim, Crossroads in the Great Race: Moving Beyond 
the International Race to Judgment in Disputes over Artwork and Other Chat-
tels, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 239, 262 (2004) (noting that in rem jurisdiction “aims 
to maintain comity between domestic courts and to prevent a second action 
from threatening the first court’s basis for jurisdiction”); Martinez, supra note 
44, at 448 (“[S]ystem-protective judicial process rules may be inherent in func-
tional judicial systems: Not only are such rules necessary to make systems 
work, it is in the self-interest of courts to apply such rules because by increas-
ing the functionality of the judicial system, they also increase the power and 
authority of courts. . . . [R]eciprocal cooperation between two formally unre-
lated courts can increase the power of both.”). 
 238. Dodge, supra note 144, at 101. 
 239. Manitoba v. Norton, 398 F. Supp. 2d 41, 52–53 (D.D.C. 2005). See gen-
erally National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) 
(2000). 
 240. Norton, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 52. 
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der the statute itself, they may invoke the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA) to challenge the adequacy of the environmen-
tal inquiry.241 If the suit is successful, the trial court has the 
option to remand the case back to the federal agency and may 
also issue injunctive relief barring further progress on the 
project until an EIS is completed.242 
Thus, NEPA and the APA are ideally suited to interterri-
torial litigation where an American court has the power to 
grant injunctive relief. Applying NEPA to potential environ-
mental harm moving from the United States into Canada is 
proper under the revised continuum of context theory. This was 
not the holding, however, of the Norton court. In an unpub-
lished order entered on November 14, 2003, the court intimated 
that the plaintiff ’s standing to sue under NEPA derived from 
the potential for harmful effects within the United States, even 
before contaminated waters reached the border with Canada.243 
Indeed, in its highly technical and detailed 2005 holding, the 
Norton court only made one comment that explained the prov-
ince’s concern with NAWS.244 Although in Norton—ordering a 
more searching environmental analysis based on potential ter-
ritorial harm245—this reasoning had no adverse effects, poten-
tial extraterritorial harm will go unexamined in cases where 
domestic harm would be insufficient to warrant further scruti-
ny.246 
This is wrong. Because neither Manitoba nor Canada have 
any authority to prevent such projects from going forward, the 
American government should at least consider the harm which 
it risks exporting. If it fails to do so, it is externalizing envi-
 
 241. Ranchers Cattleman Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. 
v. USDA, 415 F.3d 1078, 1102 (9th Cir. 2005). See generally Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000). 
 242. Norton, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 65–67. 
 243. See Manitoba v. Norton, No. 02-cv-02057(RMC), at 4 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 
2003) (order denying motions for judgments on the pleadings) (making the 
presence of harmful effects within the United States a precondition for stand-
ing when those effects would “inevitably flow into the Province”); see also Ha-
mid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1421 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining that 
standing is a separate and distinct issue from extraterritoriality). 
 244. Norton, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 47 (“Water from the project would drain 
into the Souris River, which flows into Manitoba.”). 
 245. Id. at 65. 
 246. E.g., Opening Brief of Appellant Citizens United for Resources and the 
Environment at 23, Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, A.C. v. 
United States, No. 06-16345 (9th Cir. Oct. 5, 2006), 2006 WL 3380587 (noting 
that the district court had ruled that NEPA could not be invoked against the 
extraterritorial effects of a United States project).  
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ronmental costs to its neighbors.247 Under the revised conti-
nuum of context, a Canadian court would not have jurisdiction 
over the interterritorial event—which at the time Norton was 
filed, was territorial to the United States. An American court, 
however, would have jurisdiction over the conduct and could 
exercise jurisdiction over the case. 
2. People to Save the Sheyenne River, Inc.—The Limitations of 
NEPA as a Tool to Prevent Transboundary Harm 
Even if NEPA were consistently applied extraterritorially, 
it would not prevent every instance of transboundary harm. 
First, NEPA does not prohibit environmentally unsound poli-
cies from being executed.248 It merely prevents uninformed en-
vironmentally unsound policies from going forward.249 Once the 
government has prepared its EIS, it may proceed however it 
wishes.250 
Second, NEPA only applies to “major Federal actions,”251 
and as a result does not affect privately or state funded 
projects.252 For example, the absence of any NEPA-like statuto-
ry requirement253 allowed the North Dakota court to completely 
ignore the potential transboundary effects of the Devils Lake 
outlet even though it made repeated reference to Manitoba as 
the plaintiff.254 As a result, Manitoba was once again forced to 
argue by reference to the local environment, rather than the 
potential catastrophic harm that it might face in its own terri-
tory.255 
 
 247. See Medeiros, supra note 1, at 167 (“To internalize these externalities, 
it is essential to determine their true costs and then . . . address these costs.”). 
 248. Norton, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 53. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) 
(2000). 
 252. See Envtl. Rights Coal., Inc. v. Austin, 780 F. Supp. 584, 594 (S.D. 
Ind. 1991) (stating that NEPA jurisdiction over a project only exists where 
there is federal funding). 
 253. Compare N.D. ADMIN. CODE 33-16-02.1-02 (2001) (expressly limiting 
the application of the state water quality standards to “the waters of the 
state”), with 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2000) (speaking in very broad terms such as 
“fulfill[ing] the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environ-
ment for succeeding generations”). 
 254. People to Save the Sheyenne River, Inc. v. N.D. Dep’t of Health, 697 
N.W.2d 319, 329–32 (N.D. 2005) (beginning with the phrase “Manitoba ar-
gues”). 
 255. See id. at 329 (“Manitoba argues [that] . . . the discharge of Devils 
Lake water . . . would contribute to . . . chronic violations of North Dakota’s 
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There is nothing wrong with this result under the modified 
continuum of context theory. The state of North Dakota is en-
titled to regulate conduct as it sees fit. However, any harm that 
might arise in Manitoba as a consequence of an interterritorial 
event overlapping these two jurisdictions would fall within the 
jurisdiction of a Manitoba court. That court would be within its 
rights to provide remedial relief. 
3. Pakootas—Addressing Boundary Waters Pollution Through 
the Remedial Application of CERCLA 
Sovereign immunity concerns aside,256 in cases like People 
to Save the Sheyenne River, Inc. v. North Dakota Department of 
Health, where prospective relief is unavailable to prevent 
transboundary harm,257 CERCLA and CERCLA-like statutes 
can be used to provide relief for the damage suffered.258 Addi-
tionally, the prospect of such relief would force polluters to in-
ternalize the costs of bad behavior and deter them from initiat-
ing or continuing such behavior.259 
For example, after the Trail Smelter Arbitration in the ear-
ly twentieth century, the mining installation that would later 
become involved in Pakootas developed and installed technolo-
gy that would prevent or reduce similar emissions in the fu-
ture.260 However, when concerns about the slag being dis-
 
numeric phosphorous water quality standard . . . .”). 
 256. See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 314, 331–32 (1934) (expounding 
on state sovereign immunity from a suit by foreign sovereigns in a number of 
cases, including that of “pollution of streams,” and also finding the federal 
government immune from vicarious liability because of the constitutional pro-
hibition on states entering into compacts with foreign states). While this 
would prevent Manitoba from suing North Dakota absent a waiver of immuni-
ty, it would not bar suits against nonsovereign private party polluters. 
 257. See People to Save the Sheyenne River, Inc. v. N.D. Dep’t of Health, 
697 N.W.2d 319, 333 (N.D. 2005) (using a deferential standard of review to 
find that the North Dakota Department of Health was “not arbitrary, capri-
cious, or unreasonable” in its issuance of a permit to construct a water 
project). 
 258. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000) (holding polluters liable); see, e.g., Cana-
dian Environmental Protection Act, 1999 S.C., ch. 33, pmbl. (Can.) (announc-
ing a “polluter pays” principle); id. at ch. 33, § 40 (allowing private citizens to 
sue for damages); Contaminated Sites Remediation Act, 1996 S.M., ch. 40, § 1 
(Man.). 
 259. See Christopher R. Leslie, Achieving Efficiency Through Collusion: A 
Market Failure Defense to Horizontal Price-Fixing, 81 CAL. L. REV. 243, 275–
80 (1993) (outlining the mechanisms by which increasing the cost of a negative 
externality can force its internalization and deter behavior costly to society as 
a whole). 
 260. Robinson-Dorn, supra note 16, at 259–61. 
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charged from the smelter were summarily dismissed,261 the 
smelter took no action to prevent the slag from inflicting harm, 
continuing to dump for another six decades.262 Had the smelter 
believed that an American court could hold it liable,263 it might 
have corrected its actions long ago.264 Thus, a court’s assertion 
of jurisdiction over the remedial aspects of an interterritorial 
event would ameliorate the harm that results when courts on 
the other side of the border fail to grant early injunctive relief. 
Of course, while the trial court in Pakootas understood this 
principle,265 the Ninth Circuit disagreed and instead localized 
the event by holding that “the leaching of hazardous substances 
from the slag” already present in the Lake Roosevelt site was 
the event that triggered CERCLA liability.266 This reasoning 
was not unlike that found in Norton, as it circumvented the 
presumption against extraterritoriality by making an interter-
ritorial event entirely territorial.267 Decisions supported by 
such reasoning create challenges for those who seek to enforce 
the judgment. 
 
 261. Id. at 261–62. 
 262. See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (stating that Teck Cominco only ceased discharging slag in 1995), 
petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2007) (No. 06-1188). 
 263. See Lloyd’s Underwriters v. Cominco Ltd., [2006] 12 W.W.R. 486, 498 
(B.C.S.C.) (Can.) (noting that Teck Cominco continues to maintain that it 
should not be held liable for cleanup costs, even though it has agreed to pay for 
an initial study of the Lake Roosevelt site), aff’d, [2007] 7 W.W.R. 281 (B.C. 
Ct. App.). 
 264. As a rational actor, the mining company would cease dumping if the 
expected liability would exceed the benefits of dumping slag. Leslie S. Gara, 
Medical Surveillance Damages: Using Common Sense and the Common Law to 
Mitigate the Dangers Posed by Environmental Hazards, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 265, 303 (1988). Even if the expected liability proved insufficient to bring 
dumping to a complete halt, it would still likely reduce the level of activity to a 
more economically efficient level. Id. 
 265. See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-256-AAM, 2004 
WL 2578982, at *12 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2004) (finding the imposition of 
CERCLA in part justified because “Canada’s environmental laws are intended 
to protect Canadian territory” and that the “laws do nothing to remedy the 
damage that has already occurred in U.S. territory”), aff’d, 452 F.3d 1066 (9th 
Cir. 2006), petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2007) (No. 
06-1188).  
 266. Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1075; see also id. at 1077–78 (“A party that ‘ar-
ranged for disposal’ of a hazardous substance . . . does not become liable under 
CERCLA until there is an actual or threatened release . . . .” (quoting 42 
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3))). 
 267. See Manitoba v. Norton, No. 02-cv-02057(RMC), at 4 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 
2003) (order denying motions for judgment on the pleadings) (granting Mani-
toba standing under NEPA to challenge NAWS based on domestic effects). 
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C. USE OPINIONS AS A MEANS OF FOSTERING TRANSBOUNDARY 
JUDICIAL COOPERATION AND DIALOGUE 
One Canadian court has expressed skepticism about the 
Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Pakootas.268 This is unfortunate 
given that two Ontario courts have already recognized 
CERCLA judgments entered against Canadian defendants.269 
In these opinions, the Canadian courts laid out what they want 
from a foreign court in order to enforce its judgments. Simply 
put, “foreign judgments are to be recognized and enforced in 
Canada where the Canadian court is satisfied that there is a 
‘real and substantial connection’ between the jurisdiction of the 
foreign court giving judgment and the action on which that 
judgment is based.”270 In other words, Canadian courts will 
recognize judgments of American courts where the modified 
continuum of context would allocate that case to an American 
court.271 
Unfortunately, some American courts appear as reluctant 
to listen to such communications272 as foreign courts are eager 
to discern how American courts will react to their judgments.273 
 
 268. In a collateral case relating to insurance coverage for claims against 
Teck Cominco in the Pakootas suit, a Canadian court recited the following: 
“[A]fter oral submissions concerning [Teck Cominco’s] applications in [Pakoo-
tas] had been completed . . . and my own judgment reserved, reasons for judg-
ment dismissing [Teck Cominco’s] appeal . . . were delivered by the . . . Ninth 
Circuit . . . .” Lloyd’s Underwriters, [2006] 12 W.W.R. at 497 (emphasis added). 
It is unlikely that the court would have so explicitly reserved judgment on the 
Ninth Circuit’s reasoning if it had agreed with the Pakootas opinion.  
 269. See United States v. Ivey, [1996] 30 O.R.3d 370, 374–75 (Ont. Ct. 
App.) (Can.); United States v. Shield Dev. Co., [2004] 74 O.R.3d 583, 594–95 
(Ont. Super. Ct. J.) (Can.) (relying on Ivey), aff’d, [2005] 74 O.R.3d 595 (Ont. 
Ct. App.). 
 270. Shield Dev. Co., [2004] 74 O.R.3d at 586 (emphasis added). 
 271. See Ivey, [1996] 30 O.R.3d at 374 (finding that the application of 
CERCLA was not extraterritorial because it did not seek to regulate conduct 
in Canada—it merely sought compensation for costs within the United States). 
 272. See, e.g., Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668, 670, 672 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (observing that a British court had granted the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss because “all the actions claimed to be taken by FMC took 
place in the United States and U.S. law would apply,” and then going on to 
grant the defendant’s motion to dismiss because the adverse effects would be 
felt only in the United Kingdom). 
 273. See, e.g., Amchem Prods. Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers’ Comp. 
Bd.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897, 913 (Can.) (“Any doubts that a foreign court will not 
regard [an antisuit injunction] as a breach of comity are dispelled by reading 
the reaction of [Judge] Wilkey . . . in Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena . . . .” (cit-
ing Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937–
38 (D.C. Cir. 1984))). 
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This is a mistake because in “our international system of politi-
cally independent, socio-economically interdependent nation 
states,” where nations “must often rely on other countries to 
help [them] achieve [their] regulatory expectations,” national 
courts must “act at all times to increase the international legal 
ties that advance the rule of law within and among nations.”274 
For example, United States v. Ivey, one of the two Ontario 
cases recognizing CERCLA judgments, was careful to point out 
that while the absent defendant resided in Canada, the tar-
geted conduct and effects both occurred in the United States.275 
This reservation may indicate some anxiety in Canadian courts 
over the propriety of suits like Pakootas, and American courts 
should pay attention. 
The solution is to directly address these concerns in the 
judicial opinions that decide interterritorial cases. If Canadian 
courts require a “real and substantial connection” in order to 
recognize a foreign judgment, an American court should ex-
plain why it believes such a connection exists. By engaging for-
eign courts in this way, one court system can invite another to 
collaborate in developing a common framework for allocating 
cases.276 
  CONCLUSION   
The waterways of the North American continent have al-
lowed private and public actors in the United States and Cana-
da to externalize the costs of environmental harm across their 
mutual borders. Public international law has been unable to 
control this problem, but national courts acting as members of 
the nascent international judicial system have the potential to 
do so. In order to accomplish this task, these courts must devel-
op procedural mechanisms to appropriately allocate jurisdiction 
over transboundary cases to each other. While some procedural 
doctrines, such as personal jurisdiction, have developed to the 
point where they are no longer problematic, others, such as the 
presumption against extraterritoriality and its exceptions, 
must change. By considering conduct and its effects separately, 
the present exceptions to the presumption fail to see that both 
are linked to the same event, which is interterritorial. Such in-
terterritorial events exist in a continuum of context which is 
 
 274. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 937. 
 275. Ivey, [1996] 30 O.R.3d at 374; see also Shield Dev. Co., [2004] 74 
O.R.3d at 586 (involving a copper smelter in Beaver County, Utah). 
 276. Martinez, supra note 44, at 507. 
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composed of territorial and temporal aspects. By examining the 
position of a transboundary environmental event on the conti-
nuum of context and by communicating with each other 
through their rulings, Canadian and American courts can allo-
cate such cases to the appropriate forum. If they can do this, 
then they will no longer allow a gap in environmental protec-
tion along the 49th parallel. 
